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Abstract
The central question pervading this discussion is simply stated: whether and to what extent
the European Court of Justice (“Court of Justice” or “Court”) (and the European institutions more
generally) can count on the courts of the Member States to perform their judicial tasks in ways
that are faithful to the ground rules of European Union (“EU”) law, be those rules substantive or
procedural in character. Looking back over the past five decades, I am struck by the succession
of different forms this question of national court “fidelity” to Community law, for lack of a better
term, has taken. (The quoted term is meant to evoke precisely the general duty of loyal cooperation
*526 imposed on Member States under Article 10 of the current EC Treaty.) I would suggest that
we have witnessed essentially three generations of such “fidelity challenges.” In the early years, the
fidelity challenge–or “infidelity risk,” if you prefer–ran something like this: Will national courts
accept and conform to the Grundnorms of European constitutional law, that is to say, the principles
of supremacy and direct effect expounded by the Court of Justice? Or, to take a second example,
will national courts genuinely make preliminary references to the Court of Justice in accordance
with the criteria for the making of preliminary references that have been established in the Treaty
and in the case law of the Court? Considering the indispensable role that preliminary references
and preliminary rulings play in the development of EU law, the importance of these ground rules
should not be underestimated.
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SHAREHOLDER
VOTING RIGHTS DIRECTIVE FROM AN
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE: SOME
COMPARISONS AND OBSERVATIONS
Arthur R Pinto*
INTRODUCTION
The European Union ("EU") has recently celebrated its
50th anniversary. This Article is based upon my presentation in
the Symposium celebrating the anniversary held at Fordham
Law School and sponsored by the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal. The Article will look at how the European Union has re-
cently approached company law issues (usually referred to as
corporate law in the United States) and particularly shareholder
voting rights through the recent EU directive on the exercise of
certain rights of shareholders in listed companies ("Voting
Rights Directive" or "Directive").' My focus is on company law
with regard to the corporate governance of publicly traded cor-
porations as opposed to closely-held corporations.
While there are many different forces that influence the de-
velopment of company law, I will focus on three significant
themes that influence the development of company law in the
United States. Those influences are the role of ownership, the
focus of company law, and federalism. These have also influ-
enced the development of EU company law, but with differ-
ences. I will discuss the themes and compare how they have in-
fluenced the U.S. and EU's agenda on company law. I will then
focus on the Voting Rights Directive as it compares to the United
States and reflects on these themes.
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588 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:587
I. SOURCES OF COMPANY LAW
In looking at company law issues both in the United States
and the EU, it is not always clear what law is company law as
opposed to securities law.2 There can be significant overlap in
these areas of law. From the U.S. perspective, company law is
usually viewed as the law which governs the intra-corporate rela-
tionships involving corporations and their officers, directors,
and shareholders.3 Thus, issues of formation, voting, fiduciary
duty, structural changes, and allocation of corporate power and
internal structures have traditionally been company law issues,4
while securities laws involve issues related to securities offerings,
disclosure and the sales and trading of securities.5 In Europe,
one sees a similar distinction between company law and securi-
ties laws.
6
In the United States, company law can be the product of
legislative enactments and court decisions usually from the state
where the corporation was incorporated.7 Securities law is cre-
ated in a similar manner, but has been principally a federal con-
cern.' In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission
2. For example, both involve important disclosure obligations. See Malone v. Brin-
cat, 722 A.2d 5, 11-13 (Del. 1998) (discussing both state and federal disclosure require-
ments). There are also stock market rules that act like company law rules. For exam-
ple, the stock exchange rules in the United States require a majority of independent
directors for most publicly traded corporations. See N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COM-
PANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2003).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971); 18 Am. JuR. 2D
CORPORATIONS § 15 (2008). Company law has also been found to involve "five core
structural characteristics... : (1) legal personality, (2) limited liability, (3) transferable
shares, (4) centralized management under a board structure, and (5) shared ownership
by contributors of capital." REINER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAw: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 5 (2004).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. a (1971).
5. See generally Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION
(4th ed. 2006).
6. See Roberta S. Karmel, Reform of Public Company Disclosure in Europe, 26 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 379, 379-81 (2005).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971). This incorpora-
tion theory in the United States, which applies the law of the state of incorporation, is
based upon application of the internal affairs doctrine, which is a conflict of law princi-
ple. See id.; see also Arthur R. Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control:
State Takeover Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 743-46 (1988) (dis-
cussing the extent to which the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution recognizes
the internal affairs doctrine).
8. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2006).
2009] EU SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS DIRECTIVE 589
("SEC"), an administrative agency created by Congress, plays a
significant role in the creation of federal securities law through
its rulemaking and its enforcement strategy.9 In the EU, com-
pany law is usually seen as the product of the Member States,1 °
while securities laws have evolved as primarily EU law.'1 The
presence of the EU in the development of company law has prin-
cipally been fostered through its directives, regulations, and rec-
ommendations.' 2
II. COMPANY LAW THEMES
The development of company law that is concerned with
publicly traded corporations is complex, 3 but three significant
themes have influenced that development: the role of owner-
ship, the focus of company law and corporate governance, and
federalism.
9. See generally Louis Loss ET AL., supra note 5, at 326-474.
10. While some European Union ("EU") Member States adopt the incorporation
theory for application of company laws, some reject it and instead apply company law
based upon the location of the headquarters (siege). See RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & KLAUS
J. Hoir, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 226-28 (1988). The siege
principle and the difficulty to reincorporate raises issues under European Union law
and the freedom of establishment. See generally AndreaJ. Gildea, Uberseering: A European
Company Passport, 30 BRooK.J. INT'L L. 257 (2004). It also raises issues of whether there
can be competition between Member States for incorporations creating a market for
charters, like the United States. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
11. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 380-81.
12. A directive is an order issued by the Commission to Member States requiring
that they amend their national legislation to conform with the terms of the directive. A
regulation, unlike a directive, has direct effect and is legally binding on the Member
States. A recommendation has no binding force. See Consolidated Version of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 249, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 153 (2006)
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. For a description of the roles of the European Commission
("EC"), the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Council, and
the European Court of Justice in the EU law-making process, see Nicholas P. Zalany,
The European Union Constitution and its Effects on Federalism in the EU, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 615,
628-39 (2005). The European Court ofJustice ("ECJ") also plays a role in the develop-
ment of company law through its interpretation of treaties and directives. See infra note
67 and accompanying text.
13. Recent changes and reforms in company law reflect the influence of globaliza-
tion. For example, financial scandals, increased globalization of investors, financial
markets and information, and competition tends to foster convergence in standards
and goals. See generally Arthur R. Pinto, Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate
Governance, 23 WIs. IN-r'L L.J. 477 (2005) [hereinafter Pinto globalization]. In addition,
there is a need to provide shareholder protection to attract capital, enhance competi-
tiveness, and strengthen capital markets. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
AND DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf [hereinafter OECD PRINCIPLES].
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A. Share Ownership
Share ownership is a significant influence on the develop-
ment of company law concerning publicly traded corporations
in the United States and the EU. There are three particular as-
pects of share ownership that can play a role: the type of share
ownership, the increased role of large institutional investors, and
the political significance of share ownership.14
1. Type of Ownership
In looking at most publicly traded corporations in the
United States and Continental Europe, we see two ownership
models have emerged as the dominant model in each. The U.S.
model has widely dispersed ownership where no shareholder or
groups of shareholders own a significant percentage of shares. 15
14. Another ownership difference between the United States and Europe is state
ownership of corporations in Europe, particularly in some significant industries. Gov-
ernment ownership of corporations in the United States has not been a significant is-
sue. See Patrick R. Hugg, Transnational Convergence: European Union and American Federal-
ism, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 43, 100-01 (1998). Transportation, banking, utilities, and
other significant industries have been owned privately. The lack of government owner-
ship clearly reflects a political and philosophical ideology that has a long history in the
United States. Thus, U.S. corporate law does not focus on issues raised by such govern-
ment ownership. The financial crisis of 2008 has resulted in the need for government
funding of some financial institutions. Some of the funding will be equity (primarily
preferred stock). Because of the high compensation paid to a number of executives of
these institutions including large severance packages and public outrage, when Con-
gress enacted the Emergency Economic Stablilization Act of 2008 to assist these institu-
tions it mandated limits on executive compensation for those institutions that partici-
pate in the funding. See Phred Dvorak &Joann Lublin, Bailout's Bid to Limit Executive Pay
Will be Tough to Realize, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2008, at B5. In Europe, state ownership of
some industries has been more significant. While such ownership has clearly lessened
through privatization, there is still some direct and indirect presence in corporate gov-
ernance. The direct is through ownership and even board representation, while the
indirect is through the influence the State has tried to use in corporate governance
issues. See James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate Governance and United
States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 57-58 (1995) (discussing French
privatization and the use of golden shares owned by the government to potentially veto
a takeover). Even where there is no ownership, the State can try to influence corporate
decisions through regulation or influence. See Floyd Norris, France Backs the Merger of
Two Drug Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at C2 (describing the role of the French
government to encourage a takeover opposed by a French company in order to create a
large a French pharmaceutical giant). The EU is also concerned over improper Mem-
ber State aid to industry as violating the Treaty. See generally Anastasia Tsakatoura, State
Aids in the EU Banking Industry (June 22, 2002), http://www.inter-lawyer.com/lex-e-
scripta/articles/eu-banking-state-aid.htm.
15. The U.S. model is more complex. There are significant publicly traded corpo-
rations in which there is a control group and the public are mere minority sharehold-
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This model was the subject of the famous study by Professors
Berle and Means who described in the United States that in
many of the large number of publicly traded corporations there
was a separation of ownership from control. That was because
the public shareholders may collectively own a majority of shares
but their widely dispersed holdings meant that as owners they
did not in fact exercise control, leaving the company managers
to do so ("Berle Means corporations").16 The European model
has traditionally been seen as having more concentrated owner-
ship where there are groups of shareholders such as families,
corporate groups, or financial institutions owning significant
percentages of shares.1 7 Thus unlike in the United States, in Eu-
rope the majority or controlling ownership is usually concen-
ers. They range from traditional family-owned businesses (such as major newspapers
like the New York Times and Washington Post) to technology companies (such as
Microsoft and Google) where control remains in the original owners. It may be more
accurate to describe the American publicly traded corporation as a mixture of both
dispersed and concentrated owners. See Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Found-
ing-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301,
1301 (2003) (identifying significant family ownership and presence in about one-third
of the S&P 500 firms); Ronald C. Anderson, Augustine Duru & David M. Reeb, Foun-
ders, Heirs, and Corporate Opacity in the U.S. (Aug. 14, 2008) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Journal of Financial Economics), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1142346 (identifying, in 2000 largest industrial U.S. firms, founder and heir
ownership in twenty-two and twenty-five percent of these firms, respectively).
16. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). This landmark study greatly influenced the develop-
ment of both securities and corporate law. It observed that many large, publicly traded
corporations had evolved from concentrated and often family ownership to widely dis-
persed ownership where there was no large shareholder presence in order to raise large
amounts of capital. Usually ownership equates with control, but in publicly traded cor-
porations, the lack of concentrated shareholder ownership meant that the managers of
a corporation had actual control, because dispersed shareholders were rationally apa-
thetic. This separation of ownership from control was considered beneficial because of
the diversification effects of dispersed ownership and the specialization of managerial
expertise in running the business. The negative aspect of separation of ownership from
control was the concern that managers may not always serve the interests of the dis-
persed owners who were usually beyond their control. Berle and Means demonstrated
that economics drives law, ownership patterns matter from a policy point of view, and
that dispersed ownership would evolve.
17. See generally Marco Becht & Ailsa R6ell, Blockholdings in Europe: An International
Comparison, 43 EuR. ECON. REV. 1049 (1999). Privatizations of formerly state-owned
companies has contributed to more share ownership by the public shareholders in Eu-
rope. While there are many factors that have lead to these privatizations, the EU has
played both a significant role through liberalization of competition and the creation of
the Economic and Monetary Union, which encouraged governments to sell state assets
and stakes in industrial companies in order to meet criteria for membership. See gener-
ally Roberto Pedersini, European Indus. Relations Observatory On-line, Privatisation
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trated and, while the publicly traded shareholdings are also dis-
persed, they are often in the minority.18 Thus the concentrated
shareholders exercise control.' 9
This difference has influenced the development of both
company law and securities regulation in the United States and
EU.2 ° For example, widely dispersed ownership allows for the
market for corporate control and takeovers to develop. In the
United States, both company law and federal securities laws de-
veloped to respond to this market years ago. For example, the
passage of the Williams Act in 1968,21 which amended the Secur-
ities and Exchange Act of 1934, was designed to protect the
shareholders of target companies with disclosure and a variety of
procedural and substantive safeguards.22 In Europe, this market
developed later and the EU, after many years of trying, finally
passed a Takeover Directive.23 But in comparing the regulatory
approaches of the United States and the EU, the type of owner-
ship has had an influence. For example, under EU law, unlike
U.S. law, there is a mandatory bid requirement upon the
purchase of a certain percentage of shares, which insures that all
shareholders can opt to be bought out from the company. Gen-
and Industrial Relations (Dec. 28, 1999), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/
1999/12/study/tn9912201s.htm.
18. Scholars of comparative corporate governance have tried to examine the rea-
sons why different corporate systems have developed, and significant theoretical and
empirical work has been designed to explain the outcome of dispersed and concen-
trated ownership. A number of different theories have tried to explain the reasons for
the different ownership patterns, concluding that dispersed ownership has advantages
over concentrated ownership. These theories can be broadly described as law matters,
history and politics matters, significance of interests groups, or deep causation matters.
See Pinto globalization, supra note 13, at 491-96.
19. Much of the scholarship on corporate governance of publicly traded corpora-
tions in the United States and other countries has focused on agency cost issues. In the
United States, the primary concerns center around issues of mismanagement and self-
dealing by those who manage the business, and the harm to public shareholders. In
countries with concentrated ownership, the focus is usually on self-dealing of the con-
trolling shareholders to the disadvantage of the public minority shareholders. See Pinto
globalization, supra note 13, at 483 n.22.
20. See id. at 491-92 ("A widely dispersed ownership model usually relies more on
market financing while concentrated ownership looks more to private financing.").
21. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2008)).
22. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977) ("The legislative his-
tory thus shows that the sole purpose of the Williams Act was the protection of investors
who are confronted with a tender offer.").
23. Council Directive No. 2004/25, O.J. L 142/12 (2004).
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erally under U.S. law partial bids are permissible. This differ-
ence reflects the need to protect minority shareholders in con-
trolled corporations in the EU.2 4
2. Institutional Shareholders
U.S. shareholders in a Berle Means corporation have been
described as passive and subject to a collective action problem.
They are viewed as rationally apathetic given the costs associated
with taking action to protect their interests. Further, even if the
benefits of acting outweigh the costs, rational shareholders
would prefer to free ride on others acting on their behalf.25 But
public share ownership in both the United States 26 and Conti-
nental Europe27 has been evolving so that large institutional in-
vestors are more significant shareholders in both systems. Be-
cause of their size and large number of shares they often own,
some of these investors are sometime more willing to take a
more active role in corporate governance issues.28 In both the
24. See Paul L. Davies, The Notion of Equality in European Takeover Regulation, in
TAKEOVERS IN ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAw 9, 20-22 (Jennifer Payne ed., 2002); Marco
Ventoruzzo, Europe's Thirteenth Directive and US. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means
and Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT'L LJ. 171, 191-93 (2006).
25. See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAw, 390-96 (1986).
26. Both the United Kingdom and the United States have widely dispersed owner-
ship with the presence of large institutional investors who are influential yet without
total control of the corporation. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform:
The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301, 331 (2004); see also
Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior
Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2007-24 (1994) (discussing Britain's
long history of institutional investors in its market). In the United States the increased
ownership by institutional investors was a later development. Whereas 1950, 91% of
shares were held by households, in 1996, the figure was approximately 48%. See N.Y.
STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK 1996 DATA 59 (1997). U.S. institutional investors as a
whole have increased their share of U.S. equity markets from 51.4% of total U.S. equi-
ties in the year 2000, to 61.2% of total U.S. equities in 2005. See Press Release, The
Conference Board, U.S. Institutional Investors Continue to Boost Ownership of U.S.
Corporations (Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.conference-board.org/utilities/pressDetail.
cfm?pressID=3046. Given the rise of institutional investing, it is more accurate to say
that shares of "Berle-Means corporations" (corporations where majority of shares are
owned by public shareholders in widely dispersed holdings, thereby leaving company
managers to exercise corporate control) are now often owned in large numbers by
these institutions giving them a larger presence then individuals, although not concen-
trated enough to actually control the corporations.
27. Europe has seen a rise of institutional ownership. See IRENE LYNCH FANNON,
WORKING WITHIN Two KINDS OF CAPITALISM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EMPLOYEE
STAKEHOLDING: US AND EC PERSPECTIVES 114 (2003).
28. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
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United States and Europe, one sees this phenomenon and this
has clearly influenced the development of company law in the
EU, the Member States and in the United States. For example,
the active role of these shareholders in influencing proxy con-
tests was specifically recognized by the SEC in 1992 when it re-
vised the proxy rules and made it easier for large shareholders to
communicate among themselves. 29 As will be discussed, the pas-
sage of the recent Voting Rights Directive in the EU reflects the
activism of these shareholders.3 0
3. Political Significance of Share Ownership
The political voice of shareholders can play a significant
role in the development of company law. In the United States, a
large number of households own shares directly or indirectly."1
The savings and pensions of a substantial number of people are
dependent upon the stock markets.12 In Europe, the number of
Investor Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 811, 814 (1992); Dennis K. Berman, The Game: In an
Era of Activists, Look to Change, WALL ST.J., July 8, 2008, at C1. There a variety of differ-
ent institutional shareholders that include public and private pension funds, insurance
companies, banks, foundations, mutual funds, and hedge funds. See Black, supra, at 815.
While public pension funds were historically the most active, they have been joined by
activist hedge funds. See generally Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New
Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 IowAJ. CORP. L. 681 (2007) (discussing
the increased recent activism of hedge funds).
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(1) (2008);John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institu-
tional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 837, 840-41 n.17 (1994).
30. See discussion infra Part V.A.2.
31. See, e.g., DANIEL SCHRASS & SARAH HOLDEN, INVESTMENT CO. INST., PROFILE OF
MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDERS 1 (2008), available at http://www.ici.org/stats/res/rpt_
profile08.pdf. Schrass and Holden note:
at the end of 2007, more than two in five U.S. households own mutual funds,
representing more than eighty-eight million individual fund shareholders.
Furthermore, mutual fund holdings represent a significant component of the
savings and investments of many American households, with mutual fund as-
sets now accounting for more than one-fifth of all U.S. households' financial
assets.
Id; see also id. at 4 ("The largest percentage of mutual fund-owning households, 80 per-
cent, own equity funds.").
32. See, e.g., Nat'l Ctr. for Employee Ownership, New Data Show Widespread Em-
ployee Ownership in U.S., para. 1 (2007), http://www.nceo.org/library/widespread.
html. According to this report,
[n]ew data from the General Social Survey show that 20 million American
workers own stock in their company through a 401 (k) plan, ESOP, direct
stock grant, or similar plan, while 10.6 million hold stock options. That means
that 17% of the total workforce, but 34.9% of those who work for companies
that have stock, own stock through some kind of benefit plan, while 9.3% of
the workforce, but 18.6% of those in companies with stock, hold options.
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households dependent upon shareholdings is much less 3 3 and in
many countries private pensions are less significant because of
public pensions."
As a result of the greater financial stake of U.S. families in
share ownership, issues of corporate governance in the United
States can become significant political issues and an impetus for
regulation. The corporate scandals at Enron and WorldCom
which led to the quick federal passage of Sarbanes-Oxley re-
flected the importance of shareholder protection from both a
political and economic perspective. 35 While some European cor-
porate scandals influenced the EU, the corporate governance is-
sues did not resonate in the same way it did in the United
States.3 6
B. Focus of Company Law and Corporate Governance
The publicly held corporation can be viewed in purely eco-
nomic terms as a means by which capital is raised from a large
number of public savers and used by businesses. Under that fo-
cus, corporate governance may focus on the suppliers of capital
(creditors and shareholders) and the managers, i.e., those who
control management of the business. Since shareholders are
owners, this view usually gives them primacy in terms of the goals
of the corporation.3 1 While other interests have also been recog-
Id.; see also PETER BRADY & SARAH HOLDEN, INVESTMENT CO. INST., RESEARCH FUNDAMEN-
TALS: THE U.S. RETiREMENT MARKET 2007 1 (2008), http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/fm-
vl7n3.pdf (reporting that over half of Americans' retirement savings are held in IRAs,
and defined contribution plans represent 52% of retirement assets, compared to 39%
in 1990).
33. See Luigi Guiso, Michael Haliassos & Tullio Jappelli, Household Stockholding in
Europe: Where Do We Stand and Where Do We Go?, 18 ECON. POL'Y 123, 125-26 (2003).
34. See, e.g., Carter Dougherty, After Enacting Pension Cuts, Europe Weathers A Storm,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at C1.
35. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was passed by the United States House of Rep-
resentatives by a vote of 423-3 and by the United States Senate by a vote of 99-0. See
Stephen Labaton, Corporate Conduct: Accounting New Rules on Accountants, But Also Ques-
tions, N.Y. TIMEs, July 26, 2002, at C1.
36. Examples of European scandals include the accounting problems at Shell,
Ahold, and Parmalot. See generally Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment
from Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911,
912-16 (2003) (suggesting that the scandals had less public reaction in Europe because
of state aid to failing corporations, absence of public opinion, and a higher degree of
disenchantment plus lessened personal greed compared to the United States).
37. See Amir Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and
Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 651-54 (2004) (outlining the history of the U.S.
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nized, shareholders remain the primary focus of U.S. company
law and federal securities regulation.38
In much of Europe a broader view has been reflected in
company law so that concerns for other stakeholders are impor-
tant to its company law. The publicly traded corporations also
have an impact on other interests who do not supply capital to
the business, for example, labor, which invests human capital,
and the society where the business operates. 39 As a result, in
some countries these interests have a direct role to play in corpo-
rate governance.4" It may include labor membership on boards
of directors and the use of labor councils for advice and consul-
tation on important decisions.4 The different foci have an ef-
fect on the development of company law.4 2 In the United States,
the primary issue of changes in the law remains the protection of
shareholders balanced against the need for management flexi-
bility. The role of labor or other constituencies in corporate
governance is generally insignificant.43 For example, in the
stakeholder-versus-shareholder debates). The role of stakeholders can be viewed from
an external or internal perspective. An external perspective sees stakeholders as
outside the internal corporate governance and may suggest that their interests be pro-
tected by the concept of corporate social responsibility. In addition, corporations
should also be accountable to society for the implications of corporate actions. See
Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 705, 711-20, 722-24 (2002). An internal perspective will look to include
stakeholders more directly in corporate governance. See generally Kent Greenfield, The
Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REv. 283 (1998). Some scholars have sug-
gested viewing the corporation as a "team production model" where the board serves as
a mediating hierarchy among all interests. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout,
A Team Production Theoy of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 248-57 (1999).
38. See generally Lisa Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder
Rhetoric on Corporate Norma, 31 IowAJ. CORP. L. 676 (2006) (discusses shareholder pri-
macy and the increased rhetoric toward stakeholders).
39. See, e.g., OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, at 11-13.
40. Germany remains a prime example because of it dual board and co-determina-
tion where laborers serve on the supervisory board of publicly traded corporations. See
Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations: A Comparative Analysis of German
and U.S. Corporate Structures, 17 ARiz. J. INr'L & CoMP. L. 555, 561-75 (2000).
41. The State also plays a direct role through its ownership of shares of some com-
panies and an indirect role in some industries. See supra note 14.
42. An interesting comparison is executive compensation issues. Excessive com-
pensation raises issues of corporate governance and pay inequality in society. In the
United States, much of the focus has been on aligning the interests of shareholders and
managers-whereas in parts of Europe, executive compensation has focused more on
the social implications of pay disparity. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative
Light, 55 Am. J. COMp. L. 453, 478-80 (2007).
43. There may be some labor representatives on boards where employee stock
ownership ("ESOP") is significant. See Nat'l Ctr. for Employee Ownership, A Compre-
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1980s hostile takeovers were a significant phenomenon in the
United States and concerns were raised about the effect of these
takeovers on labor and other constituencies. A legal issue that
was raised at that time was the extent to which a board of direc-
tors of a target company and its concerns for these constituen-
cies should be protected by claims of fiduciary duty especially
when implementing anti-takeover defenses. The Delaware
courts, which have been significant in the development of com-
pany law,44 clearly established the primacy of shareholders when
a company is up for sale.4 5 While a number of states enacted
legislation to specifically allow consideration of other constituen-
cies, the reality behind the legislation was to give incumbent
management greater ability to fight a hostile takeover.46 Dela-
ware has not enacted such a statute and these statutes, which are
generally permissive, do not seem to in practice have expanded
the scope of fiduciary duty outside of this context.
In the EU, the role of labor within the corporation has had
an important impact on the development of EU company law.
For example, labor representation on the supervisor board of
publicly traded corporations is an important part of German cor-
hensive Overview of ESOPs, Stock Options, and Employee Ownership (2005), http://
www.nceo.org/library/overview.html. If anything, laborers can play a shareholder-like
role in corporate governance through their pension funds. See, e.g., Mary Williams
Walsh & Jonathan D. Glater, Pension Fund Trustees Taking Aim at Safeway, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2004, at C4.
44. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
45. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court indicated:
If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment
rule, it must be reasonable to the threat posed. This entails an analysis by the
directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate
enterprise. Examples of such concerns may include: inadequacy of the price
offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on
"constituencies" other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, employees, and per-
haps even the community generally), the risk of non-consumption, and the
quality of securities being offered in the exchange.
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). Later in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., the Court stated:
A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsi-
bilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stock-
holders. However, such concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropri-
ate when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no
longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the
highest bidder.
506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985) (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
46. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 717(b) (2008).
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porate governance.47 In the 1970s, the proposed Fifth Company
Law Directive that tried to promote a variety of Europe-wide pro-
tections for public shareholders was never enacted because it
also promoted labor's role in corporate governance."' For many
years the same issue held up the adoption of the European Com-
pany, or Societas Europaea ("SE"), because of the concern that
such a business organization would weaken labor protections.
49
C. Federalism
Another theme that is an important part of understanding
the development of both U.S. and EU company law is federal-
ism. Federalism and company law in the United States has his-
torically been concerned with the respective roles of the federal
government and the States in corporate governance. In the EU,
it is the issue of what role the EU50 should play in harmonization
of company law as opposed to the Member States developing the
law. Federalism in both the United States and the EU raises the
issue of the need for a uniform or federal law for company law-
related issues. When each U.S. state or Member State produces
company law, there is also the potential for a competitive system
for the development of that law. 5
1
47. See Alfred F. Conard, Comparative Law: The Supervision of Corporate Management:
A Comparison of Developments in European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L.
REv. 1459, 1483 (1984).
48. See id. at 1461-62.
49. See Friedrich Kubler, A Shifting Paradigm of European Company Law?, 11 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 219, 230-35 (2005). It was also a factor in the defeat of the proposed Take-
over Directive by the European Parliament because it initially limited the ability of tar-
get companies to implement defensive tactics. See EU Eases the Way For Merger Deals Across
Borders-Compromise Legislation Protects Rights of Workers and Minority Shareholders, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 26, 2004, at A7 (noting compromise that had to be reached before passage
on workers' rights issues). A Takeover Directive was finally implemented which com-
promised on the issue of takeover defensive tactics. See generally Ventoruzzo, supra note
24. The Takeover Directive also requires the offeree company to give its opinion of a
bid including its affect on labor. See Council Directive No. 2004/25, art. 9, O.J. L 142/
12, at 19, 1 5 (2004).
50. There is a debate about whether the EU is really a supranational government
or more like an intergovernmental body. See Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State
Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales From American Federalism, 77
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1612, 1641-45 (2002) (discussing the institutions within the EU and fed-
eralism).
51. See Clark D. Stith, Federalism and Company Law: A "Race to the Bottom" in the
European Community, 79 GEO. L.J. 1581, 1614 (1991).
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1. The United States
In the United States, the states have played the primary role
in developing company law. The federal government could have
provided company law to publicly traded corporations but has
opted to allow the states to play a major role in the development
of that law.52 In the United States, the primary federal presence
in company law issues has been through the federal securities
laws.53 The development of federal law has been the result of
significant corporate scandals and the perceived need for a fed-
eral response. The needs are related to the importance of pro-
tecting the public investors and stock markets.54 After the stock
market crash of 1929, Congress enacted federal securities regula-
tion aimed at publicly traded corporations. The corporate scan-
dals in 2001 involving frauds at a number of large publicly
traded companies like Enron and Worldcom again led to a fed-
eral response through the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002. 55 Each federal intrusion had the effect of supplementing,
and in some cases, limiting the role of the states in corporate
governance.5 6
U.S. companies can freely decide in which state to incorpo-
rate and can change their state of incorporation without diffi-
culty. The company law in the state of incorporation will usually
apply to the internal affairs of those corporations.57 In terms of
state law, Delaware has been the primary source of company law
in the United States for publicly traded corporations. Its promi-
nence is because so many publicly traded corporations have de-
52. While the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly give Congress the power to reg-
ulate corporations, the wide breadth of the Commerce Clause would allow Congress to
legislatively preempt state law involving publicly traded corporations. U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3.
53. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Govern-
ance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859, 860 (2003) ("[F]ederal securities
law and enforcement via securities fraud class actions today have become the most visi-
ble means of regulating corporate governance.").
54. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
55. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
56. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Market rules dictate that publicly traded
companies trading in their markets have independent directors and certain required
committees. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (m) (3) (2008); see also N.Y. STOCK EXcHANGE, LISTEn
COMPANY MANuAL § 303A.02 (2008) (defining the term "independent director").
57. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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cided to incorporate there5 8 and thus its company law affects
large number of shareholders. The dominance of Delaware
raises questions of why it attracts so many publicly traded corpo-
rations in its competition with other states for corporate char-
ters. Does Delaware provide lower standards of protection of
shareholders so that the managers select that state to protect
their interests over the shareholders resulting in a race to the
bottom? 9 Does Delaware actually provide optimal standards
and thus it competes creating a race to the top?6" Although
much debated and researched,6" Delaware continues to be the
dominant state player in providing company law for publicly
traded corporations,62 albeit with a strong federal presence.
58. See LEWIS S. BLACK JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (Delaware
Dep't of State 2007), http://corp.delaware.gov/whydelaware/whycorporations-web.
pdf ("Of the corporations that make up the Fortune 500, more than one-half are incor-
porated in Delaware. It is no wonder that Delaware has become almost a brand name
for the 'business' of serving as the official home for corporations."). Incorporations in
Delaware produce franchise tax revenue and provide legal work for their lawyers. For
example, in 2001 Delaware took in around US$600 million in franchise taxes. See U.S.
Census Bureau, Delaware State Government Tax Collections: 2001 (2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/0108destax.html.
59. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); see also RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN &JOEL SELIGMAN, CONSTITU-
TIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT COR-
PORATIONS 55-70 (1976).
60. Professor Roberta Romano has described this federalism as "[t]he genius of
American corporate law." See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
LAW 1 (1993). While traditionally the competition is thought to be with other states,
some have suggested that Delaware is not really competing with the other states but
with the federal government. See MarkJ. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv.
588, 591-92 (2003).
61. See generally Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The Changing Land-
scape of EU Company Law 24-33 (TILEC Discussion Paper No. DP2004-023, 2004), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=871075 [hereinafter McCahery Paper] (discussing the
competition debate and whether it is possible or probable in Europe); see also Robert B.
Ahdieh, The (Misunderstood) Genius of American Corporate Law (Emory Public Law Re-
search Paper No. 08-35, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1105904 (offering "a distinct framework for evaluating the role of federalism in Ameri-
can corporate governance, which points to distinct measures of efficiency and a reinvig-
orated study of institutional design in corporate law.").
62. See Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 99, 138-39 (2004) McDonnell notes:
The presence of one dominant state allows companies to benefit from net-
work effects in corporate law. A multiplicity of states offering corporate law
provides for experimentation and some diversity in the law offered. Even with
Delaware's dominance reducing the incentive of other states to innovate in
order to attract new corporations, they still have incentive to innovate in order
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2. The European Union
Similar to the United States, the Member States have played
an active role in providing for company law. The power of the
EU to harmonize company law derives from the Treaty of Rome
("Treaty")6" in 195764 which established the common market. 65
The Treaty created the "right of establishment" that, among
other things, allows companies organized in one Member State
to establish and maintain businesses in any of the other Member
States "under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by
the law of the country where such establishment is effected."66
Most of the EU initiatives in company law67 have been derived
from this freedom of establishment and based upon two
grounds:
a) facilitating freedom of establishment of companies: the
harmonisation of a number of minimum requirements makes
to better serve their own home corporations, or in Delaware's case, to main-
tain its reputation for responsiveness.
See id.
63. This term will refer broadly to the Treaty of Rome and its subsequent itera-
tions.
64. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(1957) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The EU is currently governed by an amended
version of the Treaty of Rome. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union, O.J. C 321 E/I (2006) [hereinafter TEU]; EC Treaty, supra note 12, O.J. C 321
E/37 (2006).
65. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 64, arts. 110-16; see also BuXBAUM & HoL-r, supra
note 10, at 4-6 (providing a comparative study of early U.S. and EU federalism).
66. See EC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 43, OJ. C 321 E/37, at 67. The Treaty also
requires European institutions to attain freedom of establishment "by coordinating to
the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of mem-
bers and others, are required by Member States of companies or firms within the mean-
ing of the second paragraph of Article 54 with a view to making such safeguards
equivalent throughout the Union." Id. art. 44 (g), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 60.
67. The free movement of capital, EC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 57(2), OJ. C 321
E/37, at 64, has also been used by the ECJ to deal with some company law issues, espe-
cially as it concerns takeovers. For example, cases have restricted the use of golden
shares that allow the State to retain a minority interest in a firm with the right to veto a
takeover. See generally Christine O'Grady Putek, Limited But Not Lost: A Comment on the
ECJ's Golden Share Decisions, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 2219 (2004). Recently the ECJ in its
Volkswagen decision, Commission v. Germany, Case C-112/05, [2007] E.C.R. - (ECJ
Oct. 23, 2007), found that German law restricting voting rights to twenty percent irre-
spective of the amount of share owned, violated the free movement of capital provision
of the Treaty. See Peer Zumbansen & Daniel Saam, The ECJ, Volkswagen and European
Corporate Law: Reshaping the European Varieties of Capitalism, 8 GERMAN L. J. 1027, 1035
(2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030652.
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it easier for companies to establish themselves in other Mem-
ber States where the regulatory framework is similar;
b) guaranteeing legal certainty in intra-Community opera-
tions, where the presence of a number of common safeguards
is key for the creation of trust in cross-border economic rela-
tionships.6 8
In addition, Article 114 of the Treaty also provides a legal basis
for some EU company law by authorizing European institutions
to "adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member
States which have as their object the establishment and function-
ing of the internal market. 69
Concerns over the power of the EU to generally usurp
Member State law led to the establishment of the subsidiarity
principle, which calls for deference to the Member States and
for the EU to only act if national action is insufficient to pro-
mote the objectives.7 ° In addition, proportionality requires EU
action should "not go beyond what is necessary."71 These princi-
ples have been applied to the development of EU company law
where a number of the company law directives merely provide
minimum standards allowing member States to go beyond
68. Commission Communication, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Cor-
porate Governance in the European Union-A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003)
284 Final, at 6, 1.1 (2003), available at http://www.ecgi.org/commission/documents/
com2003_0284en01.pdf [hereinafter CLAP].
69. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 64, art. 114; EC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 95,
O.J. C 321 E/37, at 79. According to Professors Enriques and Gatti:
Article 44's objective of equal protection for Members and others is also
viewed as supporting the thesis that a race to the bottom among Member
States should be avoided, and/or the idea that market failures should be cor-
rected; Article [114] aims at removing barriers to free movement within the
EU and at providing a single set of rules in order to get rid of the costs arising
from doing business under twenty-five different business laws ....
Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law Harmonization
in the European Union, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 939, 946 (2006) [hereinafter Uneasy
Top-Down Harmonization].
70. See EUROPA, EU Decision-Making Procedures: The Subsidiarity Principle and
the Role of National Parliaments, http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/subsidiaity
_en.htm [hereinafter Subsidiarity Principle]; see also Young, supra note 50, at 1636
(describing the subsidiarity principle as a response to the expansion of community
law).
71. See EC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 5, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 46; see also Subsidiarity
Principle, supra note 70 ("By virtue of this principle, action taken by the Union, in
terms of its form and content, does not exceed what is required to achieve the objec-
tives set out in the Constitution.").
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them.7 2
There is no European Delaware. Some commentators have
argued for the need for competition for incorporations to create
an optimal system of rules and allow companies to move be-
tween Member States.73 While such a competitive market would
arguably have advantages over the difficult and cumbersome
harmonization process through the EU, such a result seems un-
likely.7
4
72. As Klaus J. Hopt, a member of the Winter Group, has written:
If one looks critically at the prospects of legal harmonization of corporate gov-
ernance in the EU, one must start with the premise that all legislative activism
in this field is wrong. The legal principle of subsidiarity as embedded in the
European Community Treaty, as well as the economic concept of competi-
tion-also among legislators-put the burden of proof on those who plead for
European harmonization. Therefore, it must not only be shown that a partic-
ular legislative interference with unregulated corporate governance is legiti-
mate-for example, because of market failure, or external effects, or the nec-
essary implementation of the political decision of bringing about the internal
market. Very often the answer and the right way will not be regulation, but
rather non-regulation, or even deregulation. But it is further necessary to
prove that this kind of legislation, in order to be successful, needs to be under-
taken by the European Commission at the European level and not just at the
level of the Member States.
Klaus J. Hopt, Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?, in THE MILLENIUM
LECTURES: THE COMING TOGETHER OF THE COMMON LAW AND THE CIviL LAw 105, 128-29
(Basil S. Markesinis ed., 2000).
73. See, e.g., John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EU Legislation Versus
Regulatoy Competition, in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 2005 (VOLUME 58) (Jane Holder &
Cohm O'Cinneide eds., OUP 2006); Uneasy Top-Down Harmonization, supra note 69 (the
European Community should restrict its action in this field to simply reducing the bar-
riers to corporations' freedom of movement).
74. See McCahery Paper, supra note 61, at 18-36 (arguing that an emergence of
competition for incorporations in Europe is unlikely because EU company law princi-
ples encourage maintaining the status quo-not legal innovation-and Member States
are unwilling to relinquish their company law-making authority); see generally Ehud
Kamar, Beyond Competitionfor Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J. 1725 (2006) (arguing that com-
petition for incorporations is unlikely in Europe, however a lively competition for in-
vestments has positively transformed national corporate laws in the EU in recent years).
The Delaware effect emerged for a number of reasons that may not apply in Europe.
For example, in the United States, states generally recognized the law of other states
which is based upon comity and constitutional principles inapplicable in the EU. See
generally Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law-A Comparison of the United States and
the European Systems and a Proposal for a European Directive, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
Second, the ease of movement between the states is premised on the idea that incorpo-
ration was based upon choice rather then location. See supra note 7. In many EU coun-
tries, the idea of the real seat doctrine looks to a company's actual domicile. See supra
note 10. Third, Delaware's law is often created by judicially-interpreted case law, there-
fore courts enjoy more power and flexibility in forming company law. In contrast, most
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III. THE COMPANY LAW HARMONIZATION PROCESS7 5
Up until 1989, there were nine company law directives and
one regulation implemented.76 From 1989 until 2001, the pe-
riod has been described as one of stagnation with controversies
over a variety of issues of company law such as regulation of take-
overs and the SE and with no significant company law adopted at
the EU level.77
But in the late 1990s, there was a strong EU push to improve
the capital markets and improve the single market for financial
services through its financial service action plan.78 Given that
of European nations use civil law, thus judicial activism and legal tailoring is not the
norm.
75. Professors Enriques and Gatti have questioned the rationale for company law
harmonization. They note that negative harmonization (i.e., the removal of barriers to
the four freedoms) is often linked with positive harmonization, so that what can be
gained in terms of greater freedom of establishment is usually lost in terffis of decreased
flexibility and increased costs. See Uneasy Top-Down Harmonization, supra note 69, at 944.
They criticize the "level playing field" rationale for corporate law harmonization and
argue that, "far from lowering transaction costs, to date real-world harmonization has
raised them and can hardly be expected to do otherwise in the future." Id. They find
other rationales for harmonization, such as scale economies in law production and the
correction of national governments' failures, as either implausible or unconvincing. See
id. at 966-69.
76. The process of these early directives has been described as being developed in
four distinct generational stages. The first generation was more detailed and precise
following a German model and involved publicity requirements (first company law di-
rective) and legal capital requirements (second company law directive). The second
generation reflected a more flexible approach with some options and involve mergers
and divisions of companies (third and sixth company law directives) and financial ac-
counting and disclosure requirements (fourth, seventh, and eighth company law direc-
tives). The third generation had shorter directives without details and included ex-
tending disclosure to branches (eleventh company law directive) and the law of single-
member private limited companies (twelfth company law directive). The fourth gener-
ation was described as proposed directives that gave Member States more freedom of
choice. See CHARLOTrE VILLIERS, EUROPEAN COMPANY Lw-Towums DEMocRAcY? 31-51
(1998). Commentators have suggested that these early directives generally reflected
current practice in most of Europe. See McCahery Paper, supra note 61, at 14-15
(describing the process of harmonization as beginning as "centralized federalism").
77. See Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives: How Trivial Are They?, 27 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 9 (2006); Hopt notes:
Major projects such as the Statute of the European Stock Corporation and the
draft directives of the 5th, 11th, 13th and 14th Directives were held up, some
of them for decades, because the Member States (in particular Germany,
which was not prepared to make compromises on labor codetermination)
could not agree on a common regulatory core.
Hopt, supra note 72, at 18.
78. According to Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti:
The FSAP was launched in 1999 with the aim of promoting a fully integrated
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success, in 2001 the Commission set up the High Level Group of
Company Law Experts-also referred to as the "Winter
Group"-to develop an action plan for company law. It was "to
define new priorities for the broader future development of
company law in the European Union."79 In addition there was
the need to deal with the rejection of the Takeover Directive by
the European Parliament after more than a decade of attempts
to enact it.80 In the midst of its work there were the corporate
scandals in the United States and the enactment of Sarbanes-
Oxley.s" The recommendations of the Winter Group became
the basis of the EU Commission publishing in 2003 "Modernis-
ing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the
European Union-A Plan to Move Forward,' 8 2 ("CLAP").83
CLAP dealt with a number of broad issues including: 1) cor-
porate governance, 2) legal capital maintenance and alteration,
3) company groups, 4) restructuring and mobility, 5) new Euro-
pean business forms, and 6) enhancing transparency. 84 But the
main concern of the Commission was corporate governance.8 5
European capital market. It soon became a distinctive symbol of the ambi-
tious Lisbon strategy, whereby in 2000 the European Council announced the
goal of making Europe the world's leading knowledge-based economy by
2010. The FSAP contains a wide-ranging set of measures touching upon sev-
eral fields of EU law, such as securities markets, banking, pension funds, and
insurance.
Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, EC Reforms of Corporate Governance and Capital Markets
Law: Do They Tackle Insiders'Opportunism?, 28 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 4 (2007) [herein-
after EC Reforms]. Since 2002, the EU has adopted thirty-four directives and regula-
tions: twenty-one directives in accounting law, nine in securities law, and the remaining
are either "core company law measures or at the crossroads between company law and
accounting or securities law." Id. at 3.
79. Jaap Winter et al., Final Report of the High Level Group of Company Law
Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe, at 128
(2002), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report-en.pdf.
80. See id. at 128.
81. See id. at 129.
82. CLAP, supra note 68.
83. See Theodor Baums, European Company Law Beyond the 2003 Action Plan 5 (Euro-
pean Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 81, 2007), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=973456; see generally Klaus Hopt, European Company Law and Corporate
Governance, Where Does the Action Plan of the European Commission Lead?, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND
THE U.S. 118, 121 (Hopt et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the background of the plan and
proposed actions).
84. CLAP, supra note 68, at 23-25.
85. A number of rationales were given for Commission Communication,
"Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European
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IV. THE VOTING RIGHTS DIRECTIVE
There were several proposals on corporate governance is-
sues that were part of CLAP 6 and some were quickly enacted8 7
including the Voting Rights Directive. 8 There are a number of
different reasons behind the enactment of this Directive. In
much of Europe there is no long tradition of easy proxy voting
directly by shareholders without a variety of constraints, and the
Voting Rights Directive may now enhance that voting. There
was the promotion of good corporate governance through
shareholder participation in voting, the protection of EU share-
holders who do not reside in the home country where their com-
pany resides, the protection of small individual shareholders, the
concern that increased ownership by foreign investors could cre-
ate firms with passive investors, the recognition of increased
cross border investing and the importance of integrated mar-
kets. 89
Union-A Plan to Move Forward" ("CLAP"), including increased cross-border opera-
tions activities that require common EU company law mechanisms to facilitate freedom
of establishment and cross-border restructuring; integration of capital markets and the
need to have equivalent corporate governance frameworks; maximization of the bene-
fits of modern technologies on information and communication technology; the forth-
coming enlargement of the EU to ten new Member States; recent financial scandals and
the needs and demands of investors for protection from "shoddy, greedy and occasion-
ally fraudulent corporate behaviour." Id. at 6-7.
86. CLAP also discussed other shareholder rights that should be harmonized such
as a right to appoint a special auditor and a duty of institutional investors to disclose
their investment and voting policies, which may be dealt with at a later time. See Baums,
supra note 83, at 21 n.65.
87. The EU has implemented some other provisions from CLAP involving corpo-
rate governance-related issues with three non-binding recommendations and four di-
rectives, which have all been enacted. The three recommendations "deal with auditors'
independence... remuneration of directors, and the role of non-executive directors."
EC Reforms, supra note 78, at 18. The four directives enacted include the Directive on
Statutory Audit, a revision of the Directive on Legal Capital, the Directive on Sharehold-
ers' Rights, and the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers. Id. at 18-19, 23.
88. See generally Commission of the European Communities, Annex to the Proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Exercise of Vot-
ing Rights by Shareholders of Companies Having Their Registered Office in a Member
State and Whose Shares are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amend-
ing Directive 2004/109/EC, SEC (2006) 181 (Feb. 2006), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/internal market/company/docs/shareholders/comm-native-sec_2006_018 1_en.
pdf [hereinafter Annex] (discussing the process leading to the Directive and compar-
ing the directive to existing law and practice in Europe).
89. Commission of the European Communities, Explanatory Memorandum to the
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Exercise
of Voting Rights by Shareholders of Companies Having Their Registered Office in a
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The Voting Rights Directive recognized that prior securities
EU directives have provided disclosure to shareholders, but
there was also a need for certain minimum standards for protect-
ing investors and promoting the free exercise of voting.9 ° Of
particular concern to the Commission and those consulted were
the obstacles to cross-border voting such as "the requirement to
block shares before a general meeting . . . , difficult and late
access to information that is relevant to the general meeting and
the complexity of cross-border proxy voting."" Thus the Direc-
tive was designed to provide some minimum standards.9 2
The Voting Rights Directive is a mix of principles,
mandatory rules and rules that provide companies with options.
The key provisions include:
Member State and Whose Shares are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and
Amending Directive 2004/109/EC, COM (2005) 685 Final (Jan. 2006), at 2, 1 1.1, avail-
able at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0685en01.
pdf [hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum].
90. According to the Voting Rights Directive:
The existing Community legislation is not sufficient to achieve this objective.
Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28
May 2001 on the admission of securities to official stock exchange listing and
on information to be published on those securities focuses on the information
issuers have to disclose to the market and accordingly does not deal with the
shareholder voting process itself. Moreover, Directive 2004/109/EC of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market imposes
on issuers an obligation to make available certain information and documents
relevant to general meetings, but such information and documents are to be
made available in the issuer's home Member State. Therefore, certain mini-
mum standards should be introduced with a view to protecting investors and
promoting the smooth and effective exercise of shareholder rights attaching
to voting shares.
Directive No. 2007/36, O.J. L 184/17, at 17, 4.
91. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 89, at 3, 1 1.2. According to Professor
Zetzsche, "the Shareholder Rights Directive ... failed to mandate an efficient regime
governing the identification and authorization of shareholders who hold their shares
within a chain of intermediaries" and he suggests remedies to be taken by future legisla-
tors. See Dirk Zetzsche, Shareholder Passivity, Cross-Border Voting and the Shareholder Rights
Directive, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 289, 297, 331-35 (2008). For a discussion of the various
problems of American corporate voting, see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hang-
ing Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEo. L.J. 1227 (2008).
92. Member states are free to go beyond the standards. See Directive No. 2007/36,
art. 3, OJ. L 184/17, at 19; see generally SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS AND PRACTICES IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (Baums & Wymeersch eds., 1999) (providing good
background information on voting, although does not reflect changes over the last ten
years).
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1. Equal treatment of shareholders as to participation and
voting in the general meeting;
93
2. Required notice of general meeting of at least 30 days
and certain required information; 94
3. The right to put items on the agenda of the general meet-
ing and table draft resolutions;95
4. Removal of requirements of any blocking mechanism
such as share deposits that restricted shareholder participation
in the general meeting;96
5. The right of shareholders to ask questions on agenda
items which must be answered; 97
6. Allowing and facilitating proxy voting9" individually and
93. See Directive No. 2007/36, art. 7, 0J. L 184/17, at 21. The provision refers to
the requirement of equal treatment found in the Transparency Directive, which states:
[olngoing information of holders of securities admitted to trading on a regu-
lated market should continue to be based on the principle of equal treatment.
Such equal treatment only relates to shareholders in the same position and
does not therefore prejudice the issue of how many voting rights may be at-
tached to a particular share.
Council Directive No. 2004/109, 0.J. L 390/38, at 40, 22; see also Dirk Zetzsche, Vir-
tual Shareholder Meetings and the European Shareholder Rights Directive-Challenges and Op-
portunities 68-69 (Ctr. for Bus. and Corporate Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 29,
2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=996434 (providing some examples of
equal treatment).
94. This required information includes (1) a precise indication of the place, time
and draft agenda of the meeting; (2) "a clear and precise description of the procedures
that shareholders must comply with in order to be able to participate and to cast their
vote in the general meeting"; (3) the applicable record date; (4) a clear and precise
description of the available means by which shareholders can participate in the general
meeting and cast their vote (or, alternatively, where such information may be obtained);
and (5) how to obtain the unabridged text of the resolutions and the documents in-
tended to be submitted to the general meeting for approval. See Directive No. 2007/36,
art. 5(3), 0.J. L 187/17, at 20. In addition, companies must post on their internet sites
(1) the meeting notice; (2) the total number of shares and voting rights; (3) the texts of
the resolutions and the documents for the meeting; and (4) the forms to be used to
vote by correspondence and by proxy (or where and how the forms can be obtained).
Id. art. 5(4), 0J. L 187/17, at 20-21.
95. Member States can require a minimum stake in the share capital of the issuer
in order to exercise this right, but the minimum cannot exceed five percent of the
share capital. Id. art. 6(2), 0J. L 187/17, at 21.
96. See id. pmbl., 0.J. L 187/17, at 17, 3. The right to participate may be subject
to a record date prior to the meeting as are necessary to ensure the identification of
shareholders. Id. art. 7(2), 0J. L 187/17, at 21.
97. See id. art. 9, 0J. L 187/17, at 22. In 2005, amendments to the German Stock
Corporation Act allowed German companies to authorize the chairman of the meeting
to restrict a shareholder's right to speak and ask questions. See Michael Arnold & An-
dreas W61fle, Defining the Rights of Shareholders, IN'T'L FIN. L. REv., May 2006, at 26.
98. See Directive No. 2007/36, art. 10(1), 0J. L 187/17, at 22. ("Every share-
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through securities accounts.99
The Directive also attempts to deal with the potential of the
internet 00 and thus one of its goals was to "[r]emove all legal
obstacles to electronic participation in general meetings."1 ' Be-
cause of concerns with technology and security, it was not made
obligatory. 10 2 The Directive does call for the posting of some
information on the internet, such as meeting notice, number of
shares and voting rights, text of proposed resolutions and re-
lated documents and forms that can be used to vote.10 3 Ques-
tions can also be asked by electronic means prior to the meeting
and response can be given if the relevant information is available
on the company's internet site.'0 4 Proxy holders may be ap-
pointed by electronic means' 0 5 and Member States shall prohibit
requirements, which hinder the exercise of voting rights by elec-
tronic means except if necessary for shareholder identifica-
tion.1
6
A. Some U.S. Comparisons
Generally proxies will be sought by companies for the an-
nual shareholder meeting or other special meetings. Because so
many publicly traded corporations are Berle Means corporations
and there is no controlling shareholders presence, proxies are
often needed to be sure there is a quorum or a minimum num-
ber of shareholders present at the meeting in order to conduct
holder shall have the right to appoint any other natural or legal person as a proxy
holder to attend and vote at a general meeting in his name."). Member States can
restrict proxy holders who may be connected to the company. See id. The notification
to the company of the appointment of a proxy holder and the voting instructions "may
be made subject only to such formal requirements as are necessary to ensure the identi-
fication of the shareholder and of the proxy holder, or to ensure the possibility of
verifying the content of voting instructions, respectively. .. ." Id. art. 11 (2), O.J. L 187/
17, at 23. Proxy holders may be appointed by electronic means. See id. art. 11 (1), O.J. L
187/17, at 23.
99. See id. art. 13, O.J. L 187/17, at 23-24.
100. See generally Zetzsche, supra note 91 (discussing the Voting Rights Directive,
the internet, and the need for further legislation).
101. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 89, at 3, 1.2.
102. See Directive No. 2007/36, art. 8(1), O.J. L 187/17, at 22 ("Member States
shall permit companies to offer to their shareholders any form of participation in the
general meeting by electronic means. .. .") (emphasis added).
103. Id. art. 5(3)(e), OJ. L 187/17, at 20.
104. Id. art. 9, OJ. L 187/17, at 22.
105. Id. art. 11(1), O.J. L 187/17, at 23.
106. Id. art. 11(2), O.J. L 187/17, at 23.
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business and to take whatever actions are needed. 10 7 The fre-
quent use of proxy voting historically in the United States was a
major reason that the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 gave
the SEC broad powers to regulate proxies.1" 8 The federal proxy
rules are very detailed, and primarily focus on disclosure require-
ments when publicly traded corporations solicit proxies. 10 9 But
there is also state company law which actually provides the basis
for this regulation because it establishes the rules on meetings
and voting including the right to use proxies.
In addition to companies soliciting proxies, there can also
be proxy fights where a shareholder group seeks votes for the
shareholder meeting on issues opposed by the company's man-
agement. These fights in the United States have a long and
evolving history. Proxy fights can occur generally in two situa-
tions. It can involve a challenge to the current directors by re-
placing them with new directors; i.e. change management if a
corporation is run poorly or to facilitate an unfriendly acquisi-
tion. 10 It can also involve seeking shareholder votes on a policy
issue that the directors oppose; i.e. change policy."1 The proxy
fight is viewed as creating a market mechanism to monitor man-
agers by either their replacement or influencing their behav-
ior.1 12
107. For example, under Delaware law the bylaws or certificate of incorporation
can set the quorum, but in no event can it be less than one-third of the shareholders.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2008). Interestingly, the same problem of finding a
quorum because of increased foreign ownership of publicly traded corporations in the
EU was a reason for the need of the Voting Rights Directive. See Directive No. 2007/36,
art. 5, O.J. L 187/17, at 20-21.
108. Section 12(b) requires companies that are publicly traded on a national ex-
change to register. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (a). Sec-
tion 1 2(g) requires registration when the issuer has more than US$1,000,000 in assets
and at least 500 shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 7 81(g) (1). Section 12(g) has been modified,
however, extending an exemption from registration to any issuer with assets not ex-
ceeding US$10,000,000. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2.
109. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (regulating solicitation of proxies). Even if
the company is not soliciting proxies, it still must provide shareholders with informa-
tion prior to a shareholders' meeting. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2 (detailing information
that must be provided to shareholders prior to every meeting or vote).
110. In the United States, in the event of a hostile takeover where the target com-
pany has a "poison pill" defensive mechanism, the offeror may seek to replace the direc-
tors who oppose the sale of the company with new directors who support the sale,
thereby removing the "poison pill." See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UN-
DERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW § 5.05[C] [2] (2d ed. 2004).
111. See id. § 5.05[C][3].
112. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Symposium, The AI's Corporate Governance Proposals:
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In many ways the Voting Rights Directive mirrors U.S. fed-
eral and state law and business practices, but with some signifi-
cant differences. The provisions for equal treatment,1 ' prior
sufficient notice,' 4 removal of blocking mechanisms and facilita-
tion of proxy voting1 15 are consistent with the United States.
The provision that gives shareholders the right to ask questions
on agenda items which must be answered finds no similar spe-
cific requirement in U.S. law. While it is common practice to
have discussions of pending issues at shareholder meetings and
allow shareholder questions at meetings of publicly traded cor-
porations, if a company refused to do so it is unclear if that
would violate the law in the United States.11 6 But such behavior
Law and Economics: Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9
DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 543 (1985).
113. While there is no specific U.S. rule that requires equal treatment, the federal
proxy rules are generally aimed at disclosure and protection for all shareholders, while
under state law provisions on meetings and voting also do not discriminate among
shareholders. In addition case law on protection of shareholder democracy could be
used if the directors take unilateral action to thwart shareholder voting or attempt to
manipulate the process to entrench management. See Pitro & BRANSON, supra note
110, § 5.05[D].
114. Both the federal proxy rules and state law provide for sufficient notice of all
meetings, not just the annual meeting. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-16 (requiring a
proxy statement at least forty days before a meeting); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 222(b)
(requiring notice "not less than 10 nor more than 60 days" before a meeting).
115. Unlike some countries in Europe, the United States has generally not estab-
lished mechanisms that make shareholder voting by proxies difficult. Instead, the
United States uses a record date as the means of establishing the ownership of shares
entitled to vote at meetings. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213(b).
116. See David A. Drexler, Lewis S. Black Jr. & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Delaware
Corporate Law and Practice § 24.05[1] (2007) ("Statutory requirements for meetings
are sketchy. While there are fairly extensive provisions dealing with such matters as
record dates, notice, and quorum requirements, few directions are provided for what
may or must occur at the meeting itself."). A broad view of shareholder democracy
could be used. Cf Hoschett v. TSI Int'l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 46-47 (Del. Ch.
1996) (ordering an annual meeting as required under Delaware law even where there
was a controlling shareholder with sufficient votes to act). The Delaware court indi-
cated:
[W]hile the model of democratic forms should not too strictly be applied to
the economic institution of a business corporation (where for instance votes
are weighted by the size of the voter's investment), it is nevertheless a not
unimportant feature of corporate governance that at a noticed annual meet-
ing a form of discourse (i.e., oral reports, questions and answers and in rare
instances proxy contests) among investors and between shareholders and
managers is possible. The theory of the annual meeting includes the idea that
a deliberative component of the meeting may occur. Shareholders' meetings
are mandated and shareholders authorized by statute to transact proper busi-
ness because we assume that at such meetings something said may matter.
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would violate accepted norms of corporate behavior and thus is
unlikely. 117
The right to put items on the agenda raises an issue of the
parameters of that right. Currently not every EU Member State
allows items to be placed on the agenda.1 ' Under the Directive,
the right is a matter of principle 1 9 and that would have to be
resolved by the law or practice of the particular Member State
and relate to a subject that shareholders have some power to
effectuate. In Europe, shareholders are generally considered to
have more power to act within the shareholder meeting com-
pared to U.S. shareholders and this power relates to the share-
holder ability to add to the agenda.12 ° The power of setting the
agenda is further enhanced by the greater ability of shareholders
Obviously these meetings are very far from deliberative convocations, but a
keen realization of the reality of the degree of deliberation that is possible,
should make the preservation of residual mechanisms of corporate democracy
more, not less, important.
Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
117. In 2006, Home Depot violated a U.S. business norm that all directors should
attend the annual meeting and shareholders have time to ask questions. The company
was widely criticized, but subsequently apologized and changed its behavior the follow-
ing year. See Michael Barbaro, Apologetic, Home Depot Tries to Move Beyond Nardelli's
Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2007, at C3.
118. See Annex, supra note 88, at 130, Q. 7.3; Explanatory Memorandum, supra
note 89, at 5, 2.2.2.
119. See Directive No. 2007/36, pmbl., O.J. L 187/17, at 18, 6. The Voting
Rights Directive mandates that if Member States require a minimum stake to have the
right place items on the agenda, the minimum shall not exceed five percent. See id. art.
6(2), O.J. L 187/17, at 21.
120. Presumably the ability to add items to the agenda would relate to the power
shareholders have to vote at the annual meeting. Generally the shareholders in conti-
nental Europe have more voting rights compared to the United States. See Dirk Zetz-
sche, Shareholder Interaction Preceding Shareholder Meetings of Public Corporations-A Six
Country Comparison, 2 EUR. CoRP. & FIN. L. REv. 105, **43-44 (2005); see also Katharina
Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 791, 818 (2002) ("In contrast to the Anglo-American jurisdictions, both
France and Germany created a mandatory governance structure with a clearly defined
division of power between shareholders and directors. The corporate laws of these
countries enumerate exclusive rights of the shareholder meeting, which cannot be dele-
gated to or appropriated by the board."). For example, in Italy shareholders not only
vote on the election of directors but can elect a member of the Statutory Auditors (an
internal body that provides internal monitoring), approve the final budget (including
dividend decision), decide the compensation for directors and internal auditors (unless
the charter provides otherwise), authorize a derivative suit, and decide on the liability
of directors and internal auditors. See Lorenzo Segato, A Comparative Analysis of Share-
holder Protections in Italy and the United States: Parmalat a- a Case Study, 26 Nw.J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 373, 394-97 (2006).
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in Europe to set an agenda by their statutory right to call for
meetings. 121
In the United States, in order for something to be placed on
an agenda for a shareholder meeting, it has to be a proper sub-
ject under state law.1 22 The number of issues shareholders have
the right to vote on and effectuate is limited. The main issue for
the annual meeting is the election of directors and the agenda is
usually set by the directors. Shareholders can attempt to elect
directors, but must bear the costs. 123 Since shareholders are not
entitled to amend the certificate of incorporation without prior
board approval (unlike some countries in the EU) shareholders
try to use their power to amend the by-laws to require certain
actions and thus mandate policy changes.1 24 These attempts to
use the by-laws to mandate policy have raised significant issues of
the allocation of power between the board and shareholders
under state law and whether the action required improperly in-
terferes with the directors' right to manage the corporation or is
an issue of shareholder power.1 21
But in the United States, shareholders have been able to
add other issues to the agenda through proxy fights that do not
121. See Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 742-44 (2005) (noting
the procedure by which French and Belgian shareholders may call a meeting).
122. Delaware General Corporation Law limits subject matter to "[a]ny other
proper business" in addition to the election of directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (b)
(2007).
123. Recently, shareholders have tried to use management's proxy statement and
SEC Rule 14a-8 to nominate a slate of directors to run against the incumbent directors,
which would mean that they would not have to file their own proxy statement. See Lisa
M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 72
(2008) (discussing the legal and policy issues); see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth
of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. Rav. 675 (2007) (proposing reforms to process by
which directors are elected).
124. In seeking to change policy, shareholders have the option of using manage-
ment's proxy statement to propose resolutions pursuant to SEC Rule 14a-8. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008). Shareholders may also solicit proxies at their own expense
using their own proxy materials, which are not subject to the limitations of the rule. See
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (2008). While many of these proposals do not receive majority
support, they are a means of influencing the managers to make changes. See, e.g., infra
note 128.
125. Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
I-tARv. L. REv. 833, 913-14 (2005) (arguing for increased shareholder power to allow for
more shareholder intervention), with Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Share-
holder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1735, 1735-36 (2006) (expressing concern that
increased shareholder power will hurt the corporation and the need for director pri-
macy).
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mandate but instead try to change and influence policy.' 26
These fights involve proposing a non-binding resolution to influ-
ence the board, which is a right of expression. 127 Because these
resolutions do not mandate company action but try to influence
the board through recommendations, they do not directly chal-
lenge the board's legal authority as raised in mandatory by-laws.
These fights can involve corporate social behavior, corporate
governance issues and corporate strategy. This right of expres-
sion has influenced company behavior. 128
The increased use of the internet as reflected in the Direc-
tive also generally reflects U.S. law. For example, Delaware al-
lows the participation in shareholder meetings using remote
communications or the use of online meetings. 129 In addition a
126. Proxy fights do occur in some countries in Europe but usually to change man-
agement as opposed to proxy fights to change policy. See Natalie De Filette, Risk &
Governance Blog, Investor Engagement on the Rise in Europe RiskMetrics Group (July
19, 2006), http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2006/07/investor-engagement on-the-ris.
html (noting that fifty-seven percent of shareholder proposals during the first half of
year 2006 dealt with board membership-related issues); see also Revolution of Sorts, THE
ECONOMIST, July 5, 2008, at 76-77, available at http://www.economist.com/business/dis-
playstory.cfm?story-id=11671509 (describing recent shareholder voting activism in
France).
127. The right to propose these resolutions are not specifically authorized by stat-
ute but were developed by courts under state law promoting shareholder democracy.
SEC Rule 14-8 has facilitated this right by allowing some of these proposals to be placed
in management's proxy statement. See Piro & BRANSON, supra note 110, § 5.05[F].
128. For example, in 1996 two different groups of shareholders tried to convince
RJR Nabisco to split off the tobacco business from its food operations through non-
binding votes. Some Catholic priests used SEC Rule 14a-8 while other large investors
used their own proxy statement to get shareholder support. See David Usborne, Priests
Join in the Pressure to Force Split of RJR Nabisco, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON),Jan. 4, 1996,
at 18. Eventually RJR Nabisco did split off the tobacco business. See RJR Nabisco to Split
Food and Tobacco Business, WEEKLY CORPORATE GROWTH REPORT, Mar. 15, 1999, http://
findardicles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3755/is_199903/ai_n8851404/print? tag=ArtBody;
coll.
129. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(a) (2) (2007). The statute establishes certain
requirements for online shareholder meetings to protect their integrity and requires
corporations to take reasonable steps to ensure that those who attend online meetings
have "a reasonable opportunity to participate" and to vote. Id. Corporations, therefore,
must give online attendees the chance to follow the meetings in real-time. There is also
a duty on corporations to keep records of shareholders' and proxy votes and actions at
meetings that take place through remote communication to prevent potential fraudu-
lent voting. See Daniel Adam Birnhak, Online Shareholder Meetings: Corporate Law Anoma-
lies or the Future of Governance?, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 423, 428 (2003).
Concerns over internet-only meetings contributed to the defeat of a bill in Massachu-
setts to change its corporate law. See id. at 443-44. Some shareholder activists "con-
demn[ed] it as a backdoor effort to insulate company executives from unhappy share-
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shareholder can designate the proxy holder by electronic
means.3 0 Similar to the Directive, the federal proxy rules man-
date e-proxy rules, which require companies and other soliciting
persons to post their proxy materials on a publicly available in-
ternet website and provide shareholders with a notice regarding
the availability of proxy materials on the internet."' Sharehold-
ers may now choose the means by which they access proxy mater-
ials either from the internet or paper copies and companies have
some choice on how to deliver proxy material if the shareholder
does not opt for paper delivery."3 2 Issuers and others that use
the internet may be able to lower the costs of their proxy solicita-
tions although the amount of disclosure required under the
proxy rules remain and possible liabilities for violating the proxy
rules remain unchanged. 3 Interestingly, in the United States a
number of companies have opted to continue to use paper
materials because the use of e-voting actually reduced participa-
tion by individual shareholders which could give more power to
larger institutional investors.13
In looking at the Voting Rights Directive and comparing it
to the United States, many of its provisions generally mirror U.S.
law and practice but the overall approach exhibits some signifi-
cant differences. Unlike the extensive federal presence in the
United States through its proxy rules,'35 the Directive is not seek-
ing a particularly large or significant EU presence in shareholder
voting issues. Further, the lack of an EU wide regulatory agency
like the SEC that regulates the area not only through rules but
through enforcement further limits the EU federal presence.' 36
holders." Id. at 444 (quoting Ralph Ranalli & PeterJ. Howe, OKIs Near for Online Share-
holder Meetings, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23, 2001, at Al).
130. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(c)(2) (2007).
131. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2008).
132. See id.; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Share-
holder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REv. 475, 495-96
(2008) (arguing that e-proxy can help shareholder activism).
133. The SEC has attempted to encourage the use of electronic shareholder fo-
rums by trying to clarify when their use could violate federal proxy rules. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-17 (2008).
134. See Kara Scannell & Matt Phillips, Shareholder Voting Declines as Companies Adopt
Web Ballots, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2008, at D1 (noting that "[o]n average, just 4.6% of
individual shareholders voted using e-proxy compared to 19.2% who voted in the year-
earlier period" when paper ballots were used).
135. See supra Part II.C.1.
136. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38
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The more limited role of the courts and private litigation in the
EU differ greatly from the United States,1"7 where proxy fights
are often fought through litigation under either federal proxy
rules or state company law. 138
V. THE THEMES OF THE VOTING RIGHTS DIRECTIVE
As discussed, three significant themes have historically influ-
enced the development of company law in the United States and
the European Union. Those themes are the role of ownership,
the focus of company law and corporate governance and federal-
ism. The Voting Rights Directive, which tries to facilitate share-
holder voting, also reflects on those themes but in some ways
differently reflecting changes within Europe.
A. Role of Ownership
The development of company law has been significantly in-
fluenced by three particular aspects of share ownership: the
type of share ownership, large institutional investors, and the po-
litical significance of share ownership. In the EU, changing own-
ership seems to have influenced the Voting Rights Directive.
1. Type of Ownership
In terms of type of ownership, the U.S. publicly traded cor-
poration is characterized as having substantial Berle Me'ans com-
panies with widely dispersed ownership resulting in the separa-
tion of ownership from control. Continental Europe has been
described generally as having publicly traded corporations with
concentrated ownership and thus the public shareholders often
are the minority shareholders.
There have been changes in Europe in terms of shareholder
ownership with an increase in Berle Means companies with more
widely held ownership. 139  In addition, companies may have
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9 (1999) (arguing for the establishment of a single securities
regulatory body in order to spur the creation of a European equity market).
137. See generally Segato, supra note 120 (comparing the American and Italian ap-
proach to the protection of shareholders, including through litigation).
138. See Piro & BRANSON, supra note 110, § 7.06.
139. Another trend over the decade is in the growth of widely held listed
firms across France, Germany and Italy. We show that one of the stylized facts
of corporate finance has significantly diminished over the decade. Ten years
ago the typical company had a large controlling shareholder. This is much
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large shareholders who do not have majority control or groups
of shareholders none of which are in control. Thus the Direc-
tive, by facilitating proxy voting, may help to enhance share-
holder rights in these situations where control remains fluid. Fa-
cilitating shareholder voting which lowers the cost of voting
could also encourage more proxy fights that try to change man-
agement or change policy. 4 °
But concentrated ownership still remains significant in Eu-
rope. Arguably, facilitating voting rights for minority sharehold-
ers can be irrelevant when there is a controlling shareholder.'41
The fact that a controlling shareholder has the votes does not
mean that shareholder voting is irrelevant. In some countries,
minority shareholders have specific rights to protect themselves
by voting on certain issues11 2 or there may be a super majority
less so today. In 2006, in Germany the most frequent form of ownership is
widely held; the proportion has increased from 26% to 48%. A similar trend
occurred in France and Italy, from 21% to 37% and from 2.5% to 22%, respec-
tively. About one third of this increase coincides with a decline in family con-
trolled companies in all three countries. The rest is largely explained by the
unwinding of majority blocks of widely held parent firms as well as privatiza-
tions of state owned companies. This pattern suggests that although family
ownership continues to be an important form of ownership, there is a marked
decline accompanied by a common movement across the large European capi-
tal markets to widely held ownership status.
Julian Franks et al., Evolution of Family Capitalism: A Comparative Study of France, Germany,
Italy and the UK 4-5 (Am. Fin. Ass'n 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1102475; see also Christoph Van der Elst, Shareholder Mobil-
ity in Five European Countries 7-9 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Paper No. 104, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1123108 (noting that over the last eight years
ownership concentration decreased at a moderate pace in three countries-France, It-
aly, and Belgium-but increased in Spain and the U.K).
140. The EU Commission makes a strong case for the importance of shareholder
voting and proxy contests as a means to promote better resource allocation and higher
economic growth by "a direct channel of superior company management-with proxy
voting providing a supportive control tool, and.., an indirect channel through broad
and liquid financial markets generated by shareholder rights." Annex, supra note 88, at
6, § 3.1.
141. But see RonaldJ. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Com-
plicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1645 (2006) (distinguishing
between efficient and inefficient controlling shareholders and arguing that the appro-
priate dichotomy is between countries with functionally good law, which support com-
panies with both widely held and controlling shareholder distributions, and countries
with functionally bad law, which support only controlling shareholder distributions).
142. For example in Italy, the minority shareholders can elect one of the statutory
auditors whose functions is to monitor. See Andrea Melis, On the Role of the Board of
Statutory Auditors in Italian Listed Companies, 12 CORP. GOVERNANCE 74, 79 (2004). In
2005, reforms gave additional rights to minority shareholders in Italy, including the
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vote required for a particular action to be taken which requires
the votes of the minority shareholders. The controlling share-
holders may also consist of blocks of different shareholders who
may not always act together and thus empower the minority in a
given case to supply the needed votes. But even if the vote of the
minority shareholders will not affect the decision directly be-
cause of the control, the fact that a vote needs to be taken could
change the behavior of those in control.'43 The increased use of
independent directors on the boards of such companies may
also serve as a means to have those views of the public sharehold-
ers taken seriously.' 4 4
Controlling shareholders may also consider the views of the
public minority shareholders to enhance its ability to attract eq-
uity capital through good corporate governance.
2. Institutional Shareholders
In the United States, the changing nature of public share-
holders means that large institutions now own significant num-
bers of shares and some of them take a more active role in cor-
porate governance. In Europe, there has also been a rise of both
foreign and particularly institutional ownership,145 which was
right to elect one director and the use of a list-based system of voting. Each share-
holder can propose a full list of candidates for directors and statutory auditors. See
Domenico Fanuele & Tommaso Tosi, Power to the Minority, INT'L FIN. L. REv., June 2008,
at 48.
143. Adverse publicity could result, which may influence those in control. In addi-
tion, the disclosure associated with voting could have an impact. See Schlick v. Penn-
Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 384 (2d Cir. 1974). The Second Circuit noted that:
By virtue of the disclosure either modification or reconsideration of the terms
of the merger by those in control might be effectuated. We cannot assume
that even a rapacious controlling management would necessarily want to hang
its dirty linen out on the line and thereby expose itself to suit or Securities
Commission or other action-in terms of reputation and future takeovers.
Id.
144. As a result of CLAP, an E.C. Recommendation on the role of non-executive
or supervisory directors of listed companies and committees of the supervisory board
opined that company directors with controlling shareholders should take into account
the interests of minority shareholders. SeeJaap Winter et al., supra note 79, at 59-60.
145. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 89, at 2. ("[T]he cross-border na-
ture of equity investment increases, which is further stimulated by the drive towards
creating integrated financial markets in Europe and beyond. The growing proportion
of share ownership by foreign investors is already posing the threat of EU listed compa-
nies being owned by a passive shareholder base."); see also supra note 27. According to
the Federation of European Securities Exchanges ("FESE"), the weighted average of
the non-resident investors' proportion of the listed shares of European markets was
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one of the primary reasons behind the Voting Rights Direc-
tive.' 4 6 In lowering the costs of voting'4 7 by the removal of barri-
ers to voting, providing easier disclosure, and the potential use
of the internet, it may foster greater institutional shareholder
participation in voting.1 48 If shareholder voting is enhanced, it
could encourage more proxy fights that try to change manage-
ment or policy.'49 Increasing shareholder democracy and activ-
ism15 -which often means greater shareholder voice-is not
uncontroversial, but it has become an international phenome-
twenty-nine percent in 2003. See Annex, supra note 88, at 41; see also Zetzsche, supra
note 91, at 11 ("Since 2005, foreign investors constitute the majority of shareholders in
EC Member States, owning on average 33 percent of the total market capitalization in
EC countries."). Nonresident institutional investors make up a sizeable portion of these
foreign shareholders. See Annex, supra note 88, at 8, 4.1.
146. The main beneficiaries from the proposal, in the short term, will be in-
stitutional investors that currently own cross-border shares in their portfolios.
The existence of costs, associated with obstacles to cross-border voting means
that investors are unable to become as actively engaged in the governance of
companies as they may wish.
Commission of the European Communities, Opinion of the European Economic and
Social Committee on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the Exercise of Voting Rights by Shareholders of Companies Having
Their Registered Office in a Member State and Whose Shares are Admitted to Trading
on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive 2004/109/EC, O.J. C 318/42, at 43,
4.1.1 (2006) [hereinafter Opinion].
147. The effect of barriers to voting in foreign shares means higher value and
investment bias to home country shares, which can result in an inefficient allocation of
investments. See Annex, supra note 88, at 16.
148. The voting by institutional investors "seems to be sensitive to the presence of
control-enhancing mechanisms, ownership concentration, and to the origin of the na-
tional legal system." Paolo Santella et al., A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Obstacles to
Institutional Investor Activism in Europe and in the US, 40 (2008), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1137491.
149. Institutional investor activism has also been encouraged in recent times
by the rising number of hedge funds that have a equity portfolio focused in a
limited number of companies, in which they hold significant share holdings.
Such a trend is more visible in the US, but is also beginning to spread in the
EU. The specificity of this kind of investors translates in the higher propensity,
vis-ft-vis "traditional" institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual
funds, to put in place proxy fights.
Id. Recently European institutional investors have exercised their power in the United
States by litigating in the United States. See Darren J. Check, Shareholder Activism: On the
Way to Europe, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 2006, at 60.
150. See De Filette, supra note 126; see also Carter Dougherty, Deutsche Borse Drops its
Offer to Buy LSE International, INT'L HERALD TRmB., Mar. 8, 2005, at Finance IR, available
at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/03/07/business/LSE.php (explaining that pres-
sure from hedge funds to replace directors led to Deutsche B6rse withdrawing its bid
for the London Stock Exchange).
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non.151
3. Political Significance of Share Ownership
The politics of ownership are important because as share-
holder ownership becomes an important source of societal
wealth and savings, 152 the interests of shareholders become more
important to the political institutions that create law. In Europe,
there is a growth in shareholder ownership by its citizens153 and
the Voting Rights Directive attempts to facilitate the voting rights
and influence of shareholders. But unlike the United States, the
pressure for the changes brought about by the Directive has less
to do with the political strength and concerns for public share-
holders then other concerns such as the economic advantages to
improved shareholder voting. 54 If anything it was concern for
foreign shareholders, particularly institutional investors, that was
the major impetus for the Directive.' 55 But enhancing share-
holder voting could encourage more share ownership, 156 which
151. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the
Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 1, 12-21 (2008). Accord-
ing to the European Social Investment Forum:
When all else fails, investors may even submit their own resolutions or call for
Extraordinary General Meetings (EGMs). At present, this is a rather uncom-
mon and very confrontational practice in Europe. Nevertheless, the growth of
active share ownership-reinforced by examples of the practice in the United
States-is beginning to make this concept less alien to investors.
EUROPEAN SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, AcrIVE SHARE OWNERSHIP IN EUROPE, 2006 EURO-
PEAN HANDBOOK 11 (2006), available at http://www.eurosif.org/publications/active_
share_ownership handbook.
152. SeeJack Ewing et al., Europe's Shareholders: To the Barricades, Bus. WK., Mar. 19,
2001, http://businessweek.com/magazine/content/OII12/b3724147.htm.
153. See Guiso et al., supra note 33, at 141-42.
154. See Annex, supra note 88, at 20, 5 ("Removing obstacles to domestic and
cross-border shareholder rights is a key prerequisite for the development of stock mar-
kets in the EU and to facilitate financial market integration in the EU.").
155. The main beneficiaries from the proposal, in the short term, will be in-
stitutional investors that currently own cross-border shares in their portfolios
.... Over the longer term, the proposal may encourage smaller investors, who
are currently deterred from holding cross-border shares by the high costs asso-
ciated with voting, to increase their holdings in such shares. This will enable
them to further diversify their portfolios so reducing risk. Overall, in the
longer term, the proposal should give rise to greater liquidity in European
capital markets.
Opinion, supra note 146, at 43, J 4.1.1-4.1.2.
156. Financial economists who studied different legal systems concluded that law
determines the ownership structure and systems of corporate finance and governance.
The more protective the law, the more likely that a widely dispersed ownership system
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could then provide additional support for improved corporate
governance.
B. Focus of Company Law
The focus of company law raises the issue of the extent to
which constituencies other than shareholders should be the fo-
cus of protection under company law. In a number of countries
within the EU the interests of labor are protected. This has in
the past played a significant role in the creation of EU company
law.'15  The role of other constituencies appeared to have played
no role in the enactment of the Voting Rights Directive which
was clearly aimed at enhancing shareholder power within the
company.
The general idea that shareholders who have the right to
vote should be facilitated on its face is uncontroversial as seen
from the quick enactment. Unlike other EU company law initia-
tives,' 5 ' the Voting Rights Directive did not directly threaten la-
bor participation in some Member States. But if one views the
debate about company law focus as a power struggle between
different stakeholders, then any enhancement of one arguably
lessens the power of the other. 159 If the Voting Rights Directive
does increase shareholder voting, particularly through institu-
tional shareholders, then there may be more pressure for com-
panies to focus on shareholders' interests and thus have an ef-
fect on other stakeholders.1
60
will emerge. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54J. FIN. 471, 511-13 (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, 106J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1114-17 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determi-
nants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131-32, 1149 (1997). Subsequent research
suggested that increased legal protection and dispersed ownership is in fact beneficial
compared to the concentrated ownership system. Increased legal protection encour-
ages not only dispersed ownership but also the related depth of the capital markets,
which can lower the cost of capital for corporations. See Rafael La Porta et al., Investor
Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57J. FIN. 1147, 114748 (2002). One could view the
Voting Rights Directive, which enhances shareholder voting, as a means to encourage
shareholder dispersion through lawmaking.
157. See supra Part II.B and notes 3941 and accompanying text.
158. See id.
159. A German official concerned with corporate restructurings described some
foreign investors as "locusts." See, e.g., Bertrand Benoit, German Deputy Still Taigets "Lo-
custs', FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/55437712-bc4e-Ildb-9cbc-
0000779e2340.html.
160. See Annex, supra note 88, at 7, 1 3.2 ("Good corporate governance can also be
considered to facilitate corporate restructuring, as companies turn more quickly to new
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C. Federalism
Unlike the United States, the EU has no long standing tradi-
tion of a federal presence in issues related to shareholder voting.
The Voting Rights Directive is an attempt to facilitate voting.
Some Member States had already taken steps since then to en-
hance shareholder voting, remove barriers to voting, and im-
prove their proxy system; and thus it may be unclear that the EU
needed to act. 6 '
In many ways the Voting Rights Directive was careful not
move too far forward leaving the Member States as the primary
source of voting rights issues. It avoided controversial yet impor-
tant issues of voting such as promotion of one share one vote
principles. 6 2 The EU decided not to use a regulation with its
uniform treatment of voting rights, but went forward with a di-
rective to allow for flexibility in approaches.' 63 The Voting
areas of growth, whereas bankruptcy may ensue when management fails to invest re-
sources profitably."). But see id. at 38, 1 7.
As for other remaining stakeholders, such as issuers' employees, it is not possi-
ble to give an estimate of the effect of the present proposal. As said, the im-
pact of the present proposal is to reduce cross-border voting costs, to increase
shareholder participation in company life and the quality of company manage-
ment. This should lead to more efficient listed companies, which in principle
should have a positive effect on employment. However, the chain of causali-
ties being very long, it is not possible to propose quantitative estimations, al-
though it would be possible to say that a more efficient corporate Europe
should have a positive effect on employment. Moreover, there is no environ-
mental impact of the present proposal.
Id.
161. Professors Enriques and Gatti have argued that there were insufficient rea-
sons to justify the Voting Rights Directive. They see the Voting Rights Directive as hav-
ing two goals-the removal of national barriers to voting and strengthening share-
holder rights-and that the former is the only legitimate goal for the EU. But they
think that the Voting Rights Directive goes beyond what was needed to accomplish that
goal. See Uneasy Top-Down Harmonization, supra note 69, at 983-91.
162. In 2003, CLAP had proposed a study on the deviations from the principle of
proportionality between capital and control (the issue of requiring one share one vote
for companies) existing in the Member States of the European Union. In 2007, the
Commission published an impact statement on the issue and concluded that there is no
need for action at EU level on this issue. See Commission of the European Communi-
ties, Impact Assessment on the Proportionality between Capital and Control in Listed
Companies, SEC (2007) 1705 (Dec. 2007), at 4-6, http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-
market/company/shareholders/indexb en.htm.
163. The Commission believes that the costs of a regulation could be signifi-
cant since it would not be possible to offer flexibility across the differences
that characterise legal traditions in EU Member States. A Directive would al-
low for differences in Member States' practices, preventing imbalance be-
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Rights Directive was a mix of mandates and recommendations
and more of a framework model with little details leaving it up to
Member States to implement. 64 When there were mandates,
they were minimum standards. Thus, federalism concerns influ-
enced the final Voting Rights Directive.
CONCLUSION
As described, three themes have influenced the develop-
ment of company law both in the United States and the EU-the
role of ownership, the focus of company law and corporate gov-
ernance, and federalism. The recent EU Voting Rights Directive
was designed to facilitate shareholder voting reflects those
themes but also changes that have occurred in Europe. The pri-
mary change within the themes that seems particularly signifi-
cant has been with the role of ownership where there are more
Berle Means corporations, increased importance of shareholders
rights, and the rise of institutional shareholder ownership and
activism. Enhanced voting and more shareholder activism may
also increase shareholder power and focus company law more
towards shareholders. The Voting Rights Directive also reflects
EU federalism concerns by providing minimum standards with-
out any pervasive regulatory framework like in the United States
and still leaves much for the Member States to decide and imple-
ment.
tween different classes of shares and shareholders and favouring basic, mini-
mum standards.
Opinion, supra note 146, at 43, 3.3-3.4; see also Annex, supra note 88, at 22-25, 6.1.2
(outlining four possible options for policy-making: maintaining the status quo, adopt-
ing a recommendation, adopting a regulation, or implementing a directive).
164. This is consistent with the subsidiarity principle that brought about a "demo-
cratic federalism" in the EU. See McCahery Paper, supra note 61, at 15-16.
At the national level, there are noticeably few incentives for lawmakers to mod-
ify regulatory design or reform inefficient rules because of legislative inertia
and special interest. Very generally, the differences in the normative arrange-
ments between the continental and common law systems partly explain the
deeply rooted conflict between the member states over the direction and pace
of the harmonization program. These insights provide key clues as to why only
a relatively small number of EU-level initiatives have been heralded as major
breakthroughs in the field of company law.
Id. at 16.
